Containerised restricted rsync over SSH
  • Shell 72.5%
  • Dockerfile 27.5%
Find a file
irl 2d50e22e49
All checks were successful
Build and publish / lint (push) Successful in 4s
Build and publish / build-and-push-arch (push) Successful in 36s
test: socket activation
2026-11-17 18:40:34 +00:00
.forgejo/workflows feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00
tests test: socket activation 2026-11-17 18:40:34 +00:00
.hadolint.yaml feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00
Containerfile feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00
entrypoint.sh feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00
README.md test: socket activation 2026-11-17 18:40:34 +00:00
renovate.json feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00
sshd_config feat: initial import 2026-11-17 18:16:51 +00:00

docker-rrsync

An OpenSSH server that gives read-only rsync access to one directory, and nothing else.

The image is rebuilt weekly from debian:stable-slim and published at guardianproject.dev/sr2/docker-rrsync:latest.

Features

  • One user, rrsync, authenticating with a public key only.
  • Every session runs rrsync -ro /srv/rrsync, so a client can read from /srv/rrsync and cannot write, run a shell or command, use sftp, or forward anything.

rrsync refuses -L (copy-links), so a client cannot follow a symlink on the server.

rsync -rlt -e 'ssh -p 2222' rrsync@example.org:./ local/

Hardening

sshd_config follows section 5.1 of the CIS Debian Linux 13 Benchmark v1.0.0. The ciphers, MACs and key exchange algorithms are allow-lists that drop everything the benchmark removes and are narrowed further until ssh-audit reports no warnings: AES-GCM and AES-CTR, SHA-2 encrypt-then-MAC, and hybrid post-quantum key exchange only. Clients need OpenSSH 8.5 or later.

CI starts the built image and runs two syver (goss) specs against it:

  • tests/goss-server.yml, inside the container: section 5.1 of ansible-lockdown/DEBIAN13-CIS-AUDIT with its own vars, plus checks for key-only login, the forced rrsync command and socket activation support;
  • tests/goss-client.yml, from a client container: ssh-audit, a directory fetch from the server and from a second, socket-activated sshd, and refusal of uploads, -L, commands, sftp, root and password logins.

The audit runs some checks through sudo, so the test adds a pass-through sudo to the container under test. The published image has no sudo.

Run the same tests locally with tests/run.sh IMAGE SYVER AUDIT: see the script for the arguments.

Usage

Path Purpose
/srv/rrsync The directory to export. Mount it read-only.
/etc/rrsync Holds authorized_keys, the keys allowed to log in as rrsync. Mount the directory read-only rather than the file, so a replaced file is seen. Both must be owned by root inside the container and not group or world writable.
/etc/ssh/keys Host keys, generated on first start. Keep it on a volume so the fingerprints don't change.

The server listens on port 2222. Logs go to stderr.

podman run -d --name rrsync \
  -p 2222:2222 \
  -v /path/to/export:/srv/rrsync:ro \
  -v /path/to/auth:/etc/rrsync:ro \
  -v rrsync-hostkeys:/etc/ssh/keys \
  guardianproject.dev/sr2/docker-rrsync:latest

Socket activation

Debian's sshd accepts a listening socket from systemd (LISTEN_FDS), and Podman passes one into the container from a socket unit. The container then needs no network at all (Network=none), and sshd sees each client's real address. sshd ignores Port when it is handed a socket.

# rrsync.socket
[Socket]
ListenStream=2222
BindIPv6Only=both

# rrsync.container
[Container]
Image=guardianproject.dev/sr2/docker-rrsync:latest
Network=none
...

The rrsync user is UID 2000 in the container. It only needs read access to the exported files.

pam_loginuid is made optional in the image, because setting the login UID needs CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, which a rootless container doesn't have.